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Apprenticeship incentives in Poland

By Andrzej Stępnikowski ⁽⁷⁰⁾

10.1. Introduction

In Poland, apprenticeship is considered to be a form of practical vocational education (*praktyczna nauka zawodu*) that is based on a contract of apprenticeship between an employer and a learner. In combination with theoretical training, the contract is fulfilled by delivering the skills and competencies described in the relevant curricula (i.e. by an apprentice acquiring the vocational skills required to work in a given profession and, since activities take place in the workplace, applying and deepening their knowledge and skills in real working conditions). In the case of upper secondary education, apprenticeships are organised in the context of the juvenile employment framework (the vocational preparation of juvenile workers (*przygotowanie zawodowe młodocianych pracowników*)). Apprentices are referred to as 'juvenile workers' and must be at least 15 years old and no older than 18 years old at their enrolment. At upper secondary level, this framework is available mostly through three-year-long programmes offered by first-level branch (sectoral) schools (*szkoła branżowa pierwszego stopnia*). Full apprenticeship programmes last for three years (the vocational preparation of juvenile workers – *przygotowanie zawodowe młodocianych pracowników*).

The number of hours of practical vocational education required depends on the occupation and is specified in the core curriculum for vocational education (regulation of the Ministry of Education). It is further defined in the curriculum framework (regulation of the Ministry of Education). The regulation of 16 May 2019 on practical vocational education defines the minimum and maximum percentages of education that must occur at the employer's premises. In the case of apprentices, the share of their workplace component depends on the agreement made by the employer and the school: the minimum is 970 hours over three years, or approximately 60% of the total hours in the programme.

Approximately 70–80% of employers participating in the vocational preparation scheme are members of craft guilds. There are about 40 private craft schools governed by craft organisations, with ca 10 000 students in total. In general, there are approximately 75 000 apprentices of various crafts attending public and private schools for theory classes.

The range of knowledge and skills acquired by students during practical activities, including apprenticeships, as well as the number of hours spent on these activities, is determined by the curriculum for a given profession (which is approved for use in a school by the school principal).

After a recent amendment of the education law, there are new possibilities for school directors to shape learning programmes, including access to additional vocational skills.

Apprentices in Poland are 15–18-year-old pupils that have signed a learning–working contract. About 5% of them learn theory outside of schools (in a company or at practical training centres). Each year there are fewer and fewer apprentices – at present, there are about 30% fewer juvenile workers in Poland than at the beginning of 2010. This decrease is still strong despite the actions and campaigns undertaken by governments over the last 10 years (i.e. 'VET school is the positive choice school' and 'making VET more attractive'). The success of such campaigns has been limited, as their specific set of solutions (different levels of public subsidies, handing off organisational issues and obligations to IVET school directors,

⁽⁷⁰⁾ Senior researcher, Centre for Vocational Education Research and Development, Łukasiewicz-Research Network, Institute for Sustainable Technologies, Poland, and member of the Cedefop community of apprenticeship experts for Poland.

etc.) have only helped increase the number of students in technical schools (school-based VET), while the number of juvenile workers (apprentices) is still decreasing. There are new regulatory obligations and documents that employers and VET instructors (including craft masters) are required to have, which is the primary factor that drives companies away from engaging in apprenticeships.

10.2. Financial incentives

Nevertheless, some of the actions undertaken might have a positive impact on the attractiveness of apprenticeships. Starting from 1 March 2024, the reimbursement given to companies (*refundacja wynagrodzeń młodocianych pracowników*) for salaries paid to juvenile workers has risen and is a percentage of their national average monthly salary as measured in the previous quarter:

- (a) at least 8% (approximately EUR 135) in the first year of the apprenticeship (the first class of IVET school);
- (b) at least 9% (approximately EUR 160) in the second year of the apprenticeship (the second class of IVET school);
- (c) at least 10% (approximately EUR 185) in the third year of the apprenticeship (the third class of IVET school).

For comparison, the reimbursement of company wages in the case of vocational training (which is similar to an apprenticeship but shorter and results in a certification from the Chambers that covers a certain set of skills rather than a recognised qualification) is at least 7% (approximately EUR 120).

It is worth mentioning that for over two decades the reimbursement of apprentice salaries was set at 4–6% of the average monthly salary. On 1 September 2018, this rose to 5–7% and since 2024 it has risen to 8–10%.

With greater reimbursement given to employers, there are greater chances of increasing their participation in apprenticeships. This reimbursement is paid to employers from the ‘Labour Fund’, which collects contributions from employers (ca EUR 12–15 per employee). Labour Fund support is spent on incentivising those without jobs to find work, as well as on social transfers like allowances for those without jobs and jobseekers (inactive workers). The Labour Fund is run by the government and its expenditures are decided in consultation with the Social Dialogue Council and the Main Employment Council (Naczelna Rada Zatrudnienia) ⁽⁷¹⁾.

Another incentive (a financial bonus) for employers is also sourced from the Labour Fund. Since the beginning of the 2000s, a financial bonus of approximately EUR 2 000 per apprentice (*dofinansowanie kosztów kształcenia młodocianych pracowników*) is paid directly to an employer if their apprentice successfully completes their apprenticeship programme and passes their journeyman exam (or receives a qualification in the industry before the regional examination board). This helps employers recuperate the costs of professional exams, as they are required to pay for the graduating apprentice’s first attempt. In 2023 the bonus increased by 14%, the first increase since 2000. For professions in greater demand (as announced each year by the Ministry of Education following research conducted by the Institute for Educational Research, with support from experts chosen from social partners) this financial bonus can be increased further – up to EUR 2 700 per apprentice (versus EUR 2 400 before 2023).

⁽⁷¹⁾ In Poland there are five employer representatives (Lewiatan, Związek Rzemiosła Polskiego (ZRP), Business Centre Club (BCC), Pracodawcy Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Pracodawcy RP), Związek Przedsiębiorców i Pracodawców (ZPP) and three trade unions (Solidarność, Forum Związków Zawodowych (FZZ), Ogólnopolskie Porozumienie Związków Zawodowych (OPZZ) involved in these consultations.

10.3. Non-financial incentives for apprentices

Learners who graduate from an apprenticeship also have the opportunity to complete (through validation) another similar qualification that is part of the NQF in addition to their main apprenticeship qualification (for no additional cost).

There are more and more signs that apprenticeship is a professional development path with better opportunities for a stable career and income. The new narrative in the media shows that professional 'blue collar' workers (plumbers, car mechanics or CNC operators) have faster entry to the labour market and better salaries than people with higher education degrees (especially in comparison to social sciences graduates, for example).

Although the attractiveness of these jobs is growing, year by year there are still smaller numbers of people graduating from IVET schools (including apprentices), so professionals are still needed in the labour market. A challenge that limits enrolment is the ever-fewer number of VET instructors in companies (including craft masters) willing to take on apprentices and train them.

10.4. Challenges

The first challenge for employer participation in these schemes is related to the growing level of bureaucracy connected to apprenticeships. For example, changes to the law since 2019 have created new obstacles for employers that want to train an apprentice, as they are required to get written report from a school director on the conditions required for practical vocational training – and secure this before even beginning the recruitment process. Each employer interested in providing an apprenticeship needs to prepare and attach 7 or 8 documents (annexes) to the apprenticeship agreement (recently another one was added on the standards for the protection of minors: 'standard *ochrony małoletnich*').

Another challenge for the apprenticeship system in Poland is the allocation of public subsidies which are oriented towards helping schools set up school workshops, improve their premises and cover expenses. Public schools are preferred over schools run by craft associations, and there are larger subsidies available for school-based VET (technical schools) than for IVET schools running apprenticeships. According to the model that was implemented in 2016, the (weighed) subsidy paid to schools is 2–2.5 times lower for vocational branch schools carrying out apprenticeships than for schools that train students at the school full time. This is one of the reasons why school directors may not be so eager to promote apprenticeships and may prefer school-based VET options.

In the case of smaller geographical areas, it is also not an incentive for IVET school directors to set up and offer multi-professional classes (which is common for apprenticeships, especially in the crafts). In such regions, there is rarely the need in the local labour market for large numbers of graduates with a certain apprenticeship qualification. A formula exists in which a class is created as a multi-professional unit of several specialties. Although this solution works well in terms of adjusting vocational education to the needs of the local labour market, it is a challenge for schools in terms of organisation.

As a result of these two challenges (the differences in financial support and the difficulty in organising multi-professional classes), VET school directors often prefer to run school-based VET, where practical training is taught in school workshops, over apprenticeships and, moreover, to limit training to the most popular professions (hairdressers, car mechanics, carpenters and confectioners, as well as electricians) to create one-profession classes.

10.5. Conclusions

Since 2019, some positive changes to these incentives have been observed (growing financial support

in terms of the remuneration of salaries paid to apprentices and financial bonuses for employers); however, not everything has moved in a direction that would make apprenticeship far more attractive. The attractiveness of IVET schools (still commonly called '*zawodówki*') and the apprenticeship system is still a fundamental problem in Poland. Of course, the recent increases in the size of incentives should be monitored constantly and compared with economic trends and impacts. Not only that, but to stop the degradation of the importance of vocational training, which is unfavourable for the economy and society, it is necessary to modify certain legal provisions and strengthen economic instruments, including subsidies, which will undoubtedly encourage the bodies governing schools and school principals to continue to offer the possibility of education in multi-vocational classes. This is particularly important as there is an observed increase in the interest of students and their parents in vocational education, for which they have been waiting for many years.

Apprenticeship incentives in Spain

By Guillem Salvans ⁽⁷²⁾

11.1. Introduction

Spain undertook a reform of its VET system in 2022 through a new national law (Spanish Government, 2022), which introduced significant changes. In terms of the relationship between companies and VET schools within the VET system, the law granted a 'dual character' to all IVET ⁽⁷³⁾ and parts of CVET. Schools and companies are jointly responsible for training students within this new framework. In practice, this principle means that there are two implementation pathways, general VET and intensive VET, which can be differentiated by the three following characteristics:

- (a) the duration of in-company training: general VET is shorter than intensive VET ⁽⁷⁴⁾, but in both cases in-company training is compulsory for all students,
- (b) the percentage of the learning outcomes to be achieved in companies ⁽⁷⁵⁾,
- (c) an obligation to provide a labour contract to students, which has only been established for intensive VET, although it was established with a transitional period that ends in 2028 ⁽⁷⁶⁾.

Intensive VET can be considered an apprenticeship if we look at the European framework for quality and effective apprenticeships criteria.

The dual nature of all IVET and parts of CVET has profound consequences that will unfold in the coming years and that represent a major challenge in the transformation of Spanish VET. Some of the challenges are related to the mindset of companies, VET schools and VET stakeholders; companies need to understand that they are active agents in VET programmes. Secondly, VET schools need to understand that their actions affect not only students but also companies. These will require long-term mindset changes, which will be difficult to achieve, but Spain has already started to move in this direction and there are very good examples to back up this change.

The law facilitates the adoption of this dual characterisation of VET by, among other things:

- (a) increasing the minimum training time spent in companies both in general VET and intensive VET;
- (b) regulating the existence of an in-company training plan for each student;
- (c) changing the relevance of the learning outcomes achieved in-company, which are now part of specific modules, so that companies and VET schools share learning outcomes within several modules in the training plan;
- (d) requiring in-company training in each of the two years of the programme (e.g. the standard duration of IVET is 2 years, and the legal framework establishes that there must be in-company training in both years);
- (e) enabling the joint selection of students by companies and VET schools;
- (f) increasing the ability of VET schools and regions to adapt VET programmes locally in a number of ways;

⁽⁷²⁾ Senior project manager, Fundación Bertelsmann, Spain, and member of the Cedefop community of apprenticeship experts for Spain.

⁽⁷³⁾ This contribution considers IVET to be the middle and upper levels of Spanish VET.

⁽⁷⁴⁾ General VET is 25–35% of the total duration of regular VET (or 20% that of basic VET programmes). Intensive VET 35–50% of the total duration of regular VET.

⁽⁷⁵⁾ In general VET, 10–20% of the learning outcomes are to be achieved in a company, while in intensive VET 30% are.

⁽⁷⁶⁾ During the transitional period, companies can provide a labour contract or a grant, both of which are paid for by companies. From January 2029, only the labour contract will be allowed (see Cedefop, 2023).

- (g) reinforcing the roles of the company tutor and the VET school tutor as key figures in delivering apprentice training;
- (h) specifying the roles of intermediate bodies in the VET system (chambers of commerce, business associations, municipalities, foundations, etc.);
- (i) allowing the rotation of students between (small) companies to achieve concrete learning outcomes;
- (j) in intensive VET, linking the student to the company through a labour contract.

This chapter examines whether these changes constitute an incentive for companies to participate in VET. It discusses some of these issues in a non-exhaustive way, focusing on flexibility in the programmes, the role of intermediate bodies, the student selection process, the development of training plans in companies and the attractiveness of the apprenticeship pathway.

11.2. Programme flexibility: a major incentive that needs to be explained to companies

The adoption of a flexible framework is a major attraction for companies, especially at the sectoral level. As some flexible measures are new in Spain (such as the possibility of including optional modules in VET schools), it will take a few years for companies to become aware of them and to become familiar with them. Schools and all parties involved in the VET system have a lot of work to do in this respect. However, based on insights gathered from ongoing dialogue with companies and their representatives over the past decade, flexibility is consistently identified as a top priority. This suggests that a flexible approach may be appropriate and well-aligned with industry needs.

The new regulation is clearly committed to the adoption of a flexible framework that is attractive to businesses, which will include the following measures, among others:

- (a) Beyond the national core curriculum, regional authorities can modify the content of different programmes, for example by modifying the distribution or duration of different modules over the years of the course;
- (b) Training can be adapted to the local economic environment; this flexibility allows for the introduction of training that is part of the NQF and/or training that is not in the NQF;
- (c) The length of the programme can be extended (usually due to an extension of the time spent on in-company training).

In short, the flexibility offered by the new regulation can be seen as a strong incentive for companies. However, regional authorities and VET schools play a crucial role in promoting these measures, particularly through disseminating them effectively during their initial implementation.

11.3. Intermediate bodies are critical for developing the dual characteristics of VET (and improving the quality of programmes)

A clear benefit for companies is the role of that intermediate bodies play, which the new legislation reinforces. These bodies have developed in the last decade, especially in the apprenticeship pathway ⁽⁷⁷⁾. The work they do in disseminating and recruiting companies for programmes, advising companies, conveying the sectoral content that should be included in VET programmes to regulators, grouping small businesses for shared projects and so on constitutes an incentive for companies. In this frame-

⁽⁷⁷⁾ For specific examples, see Fundación Bertelsmann publication [Buenas prácticas: Proyecto para la mejora de la Calidad](#) [Good Practices: Project for Quality Improvement].

work, companies feel (and are) better assisted in their participation in the VET system. Spain already has first-rate examples of organisations and government bodies carrying out these roles (for example, the work carried out by the Chamber of Commerce of Mallorca, the territorial business associations of La Rioja and the Basque Country, the City Council of Malaga or the foundation that Barcelona City Council has created to promote VET, which is called the Barcelona FP Foundation). It is also important to note that these roles are often carried out by large companies, at least during the initial promotion of sectoral projects. Additionally, the work that the Spanish Chamber of Commerce is carrying out to support apprenticeships, which many local chambers adhere to, makes it another excellent example of an intermediate body.

The roles of intermediate bodies are not overly institutionalised in Spain; it is at the regional or local level that one entity or another carries out this type of task. This process, which is in itself very interesting and which the law wants to reinforce, is, however, 'incipient' in Spain and there are still dozens of intermediate bodies that could be linked to vocational training, especially at the local level. It would be very appropriate, in the coming years, for these organisations (chambers of commerce, sectoral business associations, clusters) to become better involved in the VET system, both in general and intensive VET, by building on existing successful examples.

Increasing the involvement of intermediate bodies in the VET system in Spain not only benefits companies but is also one of the most strategic changes that could take place in the coming years. This is because we know that the more an organisation is involved in the VET system, the higher quality the VET programme will become, especially the apprenticeship pathway.

In short, Spain would need to promote this process with some kind of support from public funds, which could be provided for just a couple of years. This would encourage intermediate bodies to become involved in VET, especially at the local and sectoral levels.

11.4. Student recruitment: a shared process

The selection of students becoming a process shared between a school and a company is a further incentive for employers. The new regulation makes explicit reference to it. From now on, companies must be involved in student recruitment for both general and intensive VET.

Spain has a particularly school-based vocational training system, and the leadership of these programmes therefore lies within the education sector. As such, companies have not been heavily involved in the selection of students. However, in the last decade, and especially in apprenticeships (for which students receive a remuneration in most regions), companies have become (more) involved in the recruitment process. At present, a shared selection process is more common in intensive VET than general VET. Normally, the school creates a preliminary list of candidates based on its knowledge of the students and the company, and the company ends up choosing the student. Therefore, at least for intensive VET, the new regulation has recognised the situation that was already partially in place. However, it is important to consolidate the use of this shared process in general and intensive VET, especially now that the length of time spent in the company has been increased.

11.5. Achieving learning outcomes in companies: making the task possible for (small) companies

11.5.1. The situation before the 2022 legal reform

Before 2022, all students in Spain were required to undertake a compulsory in-company placement, which was 'one module in the training programme' (*Formación en Centros de Trabajo*). In the internship

pathway, this was a requirement for students to complete the programme. The apprenticeship pathway involved a longer period spent at the company and the achievement of more learning outcomes there.

In the internship pathway, companies could easily meet these learning outcomes because students could practice their skills across a wide range of the companies' production processes. In-company training usually took place at the end of the programme, when the student already had received most of their training. This was most common, and the situation for around 95% of IVET students. In apprenticeships, the commitment the companies made was much larger, but apprenticeships were about 5% of the total number of IVET students.

11.5.2. The situation after the 2022 legal reform

With the current regulation, the module that covered the in-company placement disappeared from both general and intensive VET. Instead, parts of different modules are related to the in-company placement (each with its own specific learning outcomes). This distribution of the training load between companies and VET schools is established by means of the training plan that each student is obliged to have.

This important change is consistent with the idea of giving responsibility to both companies and VET schools. If companies share responsibility for the training of students, it seems appropriate that they share in the training conducted in the different modules from the earliest stages of the course. Once again, the question is now how will companies take this change, is it an incentive or a barrier to their participation in the VET system?

Firstly, companies can only train students in what they know. Therefore, it seems that the smaller the company, the more difficulties it may have in following the new curriculum requirements. Companies will tend to not want to participate in VET if they are required to make a complex curricular commitment. This matter was predicted by the government; the new regulation supports the grouping of SMEs to train students on a rotational basis (Spanish Government, 2022. Article 59), so that there is joint responsibility for students reaching the expected learning outcomes. Rotational VET projects already exist in Spanish VET (mainly in apprenticeships) but seem difficult to scale up. In short, for smaller companies, the demand for specific learning outcomes in different modules is a challenge that will have to be explained, managed and assisted with.

Secondly, companies may have difficulties in understanding the language of VET schools and the technicalities that shape the deployment of training plans. Companies can make explicit what can be learned in their work environment, which they are very familiar with, but they need a lot of support in translating this into learning outcomes (and in assessing them). Therefore, involving companies in these technicalities is complex.

In sum, this change does not automatically facilitate the participation of companies in the new legal framework. However, this essential change ensures that the 'dual nature' VET sought by the regulators of the framework will be upheld. As a consequence, VET schools will have to make it easy for companies, assist them and help them understand the new legal framework. The work of teachers in VET schools will be essential in this area. If Spain succeeds in transforming in-company training into a more planned and coordinated placement (similar to what was happening during apprenticeships before the legal reform), the progress will be remarkable. Finally, this topic is sufficiently important that its deployment should be evaluated.

11.6. Is the apprenticeship pathway attractive to companies?

In this chapter, we have described the difference between the two VET pathways in Spain. These differences are the time spent in the company, the learning outcomes obtained while in the company, the use of a labour contract to link students to companies and the remuneration paid to the student (there is no remuneration in general VET and a salary in intensive VET).

The labour contract used in intensive VET (apprenticeships) is the regular Spanish training contract. It enables partial reimbursement of social security contributions for apprentices, partial compensation for the time spent by the company tutor to train apprentices, and incentives for the company to hire apprentices after their training period. Apprentices receive a salary (at least the minimum wage) only for the time spent at the company (for the main aspects of the contract, see Servicio Público de Empleo Estatal (SEPE), 2023).

The question we should ask ourselves is whether the new regulation is an incentive for the adoption of apprenticeships or not; that is, whether this framework will make apprenticeships a modality chosen by companies. Given that we are still in the transitional period of adopting this regulation, we do not know what will happen in the future. However, some guesses can be made.

In the last decade, the expansion of apprenticeships in Spain has been very limited in quantitative terms (less than 5% of students choose apprenticeships) and has been concentrated in higher VET (which can be accessed from the age of 18). Despite this, it has become a modality of excellence in which some of the most innovative and unique programmes have been observed. The experience of the apprenticeship system gained from 2012 to 2022 has shaped this idea of a 'dual nature' for IVET and parts of CVET in Spain.

In this regard, when deciding whether they want to participate in apprenticeships or not, companies will look to strike a balance between the student spending more time in the company and the curricular commitment and payment of a salary to the apprentice. These considerations alone lead us to think that intensive VET will see very limited use in this new legal framework, as is already happening de facto in many Spanish regions, especially the less industrialised ones.

However, there are more elements to add to the debate when it comes to the motivation and engagement of companies. The first is how companies attract talent companies and motivate students. Receiving a salary while acquiring skills in a company is highly incentivising for students. The companies for which collaboration with the VET system in Spain is very strategic (companies which, for example, want to attract talent to professions and regions where it is scarce, a situation that is far from unusual in Spain) are more likely to be involved in the apprenticeship (intensive VET) pathway in order to attract talent and entice students with a labour contract.

Having said this, it is necessary to look at the meaning of this pathway. Apprenticeships should be seen as the pathway for students wanting to gain quick access to the labour market. This is very important, because companies are often frustrated when they cannot hire a student because he/she wants to continue his/her training once the training period is over.

Fortunately, the Spanish VET system is very flexible and offers many options for further training. Given that, VET schools could make first filter between students who have enrolled in VET programmes and are planning to continue their training and students who wish to work immediately. In general, the first group of students would follow the general VET pathway and the second one the apprenticeship pathway. As a result, schools would have a strong argument for convincing companies to use apprenticeships, which is the immediate incorporation of qualified staff into their company after the end of the training period. This strategy would not be possible to use for all programmes and situations (for instance, there may be a lack of companies willing to provide contracts or a lack of students willing to work after their training period), but as a general guideline it could add value to apprenticeships.

Finally, it seems that the intensive pathway could be used to structure career plans in companies as the first of a series of structured and planned stages through which a young apprentice will pass. Companies in sectors and regions where talent is in short supply need to think about this. Nevertheless, this approach seems perfectly suitable for medium and large companies but seems more difficult for very small or small companies to carry out. In the latter case, the regulators of the new legislation could consider some kind of subsidy of the wage cost that an apprenticeship represents for these companies, at least for a few years, in order to incentivise small companies to take the first steps.

Beyond this potential incentive, very small and small enterprises will only hire students if the manage-

ment of their contracts is simple and accessible. Therefore, once again, very small and small enterprises need support from schools and intermediate bodies.

11.7. Concluding remarks

This chapter described whether some key aspects of the new Spanish VET regulation are real incentives for companies. Beyond specific incentives, the VET framework itself must be attractive to enterprises. If it is not, companies will simply not participate. The incentives must be offered within a framework of quality programmes and quality in-company training.

Spain has a long tradition of encouraging cooperation between companies and VET schools within the VET system. For example, since the 1990s all students have had a mandatory in-company training period. The relationship between companies and educational institutions is therefore very strong, but Spain is creating a new framework that will take some years to consolidate. The use of curricular flexibility, the incentives to strengthen intermediate bodies and the reinforcement of student selection as a shared process between companies and schools seem to be attractive to companies. The curricular requirements companies must fulfil could be a challenge, especially if there is no support from VET schools and intermediate bodies.

The deployment and implementation of this entire legal framework will be the responsibility of regional authorities, given the distribution of competences in managing education in Spain. Therefore, regional regulators will have to encourage companies to participate in IVET.

The value of intensive VET will be revealed through its relationship to general VET. For example, intensive VET could be the pathway for those who seek quick incorporation into the labour market. Calculating the cost–benefit balance of apprenticeships within this new legal framework, as is done in other European countries, could provide companies with arguments for hiring apprentices. Temporarily subsidising part of these contracts for smaller companies would also be a strategy that allows smaller companies to ‘test’ their participation in this type of scheme.

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Apprenticeships: incentives for employers and learners

This publication, based on contributions from members of the [Cedefop community of apprenticeship experts](#), sheds light on how selected incentives for learners and employers participating in apprenticeships across Europe are designed, introduced and received by their target groups. The evidence presented, which is complemented by reflections on the suitability, effectiveness and sustainability of the selected instruments, will help policymakers to introduce better targeted and more effective incentives that benefit learners, employers and societies. The variation in the organisation and implementation of apprenticeship schemes across Europe is also reflected in the different incentives that exist to increase learner and employer participation, which include financial and non-financial, horizontal and targeted incentives. While many instruments meet their goals, others fall short or are difficult to maintain.



CEDEFOP

European Centre for the Development
of Vocational Training

Europe 123, Thessaloniki (Pylea), GREECE

Postal address: Cedefop service post, 570 01 Themi, GREECE

Tel. +30 2310490111, Fax +30 2310490020, Email: info@cedefop.europa.eu

visit our portal www.cedefop.europa.eu



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